

## Seminar

### **Global Power Shifts and the Global World Order**

**Professor Robert Kappel**, Senior Researcher and President Emeritus of GIGA  
„German Institute of Global and Area Studies“, Hamburg

#### Dates:

**Fridays: June 2, 9, 16**

**Wednesdays: June 7, 14, 21**

**Time: 9:00-13:00**

#### Registration through:

**Adi Vexler**, MA Studies Coordinator, HCGES [amoskattel@univ.haifa.ac.il](mailto:amoskattel@univ.haifa.ac.il)

The Haifa Center for German and European Studies will conduct a **2 credits course** „Global Power Shifts and the New Global World Order“. The course will take place in Haifa from the **2<sup>nd</sup> to the 21<sup>st</sup> of June 2017** and will include 24 academic hours of teaching (six sessions of 4 hours each, twice a week). The seminar will enable its participants to earn credit points in their respective study programs. The course will survey the most important changes and challenges of global power shifts and global governance, providing an overview of the decline of the traditional powers (US and EU), the rise of China and other regional powers, the fragmentation of the world, and dealing with economic power shifts, US power, European developments, and Germany's agenda as the European hegemon. The debates on the future of global economic governance have been particularly acute after the global financial crisis. Entrusting global economic governance from G7/8 to the G20 in order to include emerging powers has been marked as a milestone in global governance. Despite this change, significant challenges remain and gaps still need to be filled to solve global governance. The course will be taught by **Prof. Robert Kappel** (GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg).

#### Requirements:

- Presence in class and active participation (15%)
- 1 Assignment (35%)
- Take home exam (50%)

#### Seminar Program

##### Friday, June 2

***Overview: The Economics of Global Power Shifts. Empirics and Theories.***

This session covers the basics and provides an overview of global economic and political trends, including the decline of the US and EU, the rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), and fragmentation of the global order. It characterizes global power shifts, historical changes and characterizes the main economic trends. On a world scale, economic integration has risen rapidly in recent years. The Uruguay and Doha Rounds have reduced trade restrictions; transport and communication costs are falling.

The world is getting flatter. The former distinction between core and periphery (rich industrialized countries and poor developing countries) is no longer valid, because many developing countries are catching up. There is an economic and political power shift, which is associated with a relative decline of the “West” and a relative rise of the “East”. The emerging economies are regional powers and partly even global powers. China and other regional powers will not seek to undermine the capitalist system and the ideas and principles of the global liberal order, as some authors have argued, but instead will try to gain more leadership within it. The session will deal with the following question: What is meant by global power shift? What are the criteria for an analysis of global changes? Which countries rise and which decline? Which role does the resp. region play for the rise of regional powers?

### **Wednesday, June 7**

#### ***Political Science Approaches. The realistic school and the liberal school***

To what extent do countries like China, the United States or Germany still or already play the role of a “benign hegemon”? Mearsheimer (realism; hard power), Nye (soft power approach), Ikenberry (liberal order), Nolte (criteria of power), Charles Kindleberger and some others have worked out several key criteria for leadership power. According to Kindleberger’s definition, a benign hegemon provides reliable regulatory systems and is thus recognized as a stabilizing power that makes a contribution to peace. For Kindleberger, the adoption of this role presupposes a willingness to absorb a disproportionate share of the costs for the stabilization of the financial and economic system. A hegemon must have the power and capacity to fulfil this role and, in particular, ensure the following conditions: acceptance of the open market, provision of long-term financing; stable exchange rate system, the securing of macroeconomic and monetary policy coordination, peaceful international relations, and capacity to transform. A hegemon must be ready to lead. We will deal with the following questions: What is hard and soft power? What is about power hierarchies, leaders and followers?

### **Friday, June 9**

#### ***Country Studies: Brazil, Russia, India, China, Israel and South Africa – How do they shape the regional and international order?***

The session focuses on the emergence of new international powers. Through the study of these countries, we will review new understandings of what 'emergence' stands for, the interactions with their regional and global environments, the rise of multipolarity and the implications of the end of the equation between globalization and 'Americanization'. The session will also discuss emerging powers' aspirations to a global role through membership of global governance institutions, coalition-building and a new assertiveness within multilateral organizations. The leadership performance of emerging powers will be addressed in conjunction with the serious gap between aspirations and achievements. Country and case studies will emphasize the 'new' foreign policy of India, Brazil, Israel and China and their soft and hard power approaches to their neighborhoods, peace and security, trade cooperation etc. This session will focus on different approaches and strategies of different countries in their resp. region and their global activities.

**Wednesday, June 14**

***US Decline or US Hegemony?***

It is fashionable to compare the United States' power to that of the United Kingdom a century ago and to predict a similar hegemonic decline. The word "decline" mixes up two different dimensions: absolute decline, in the sense of decay, and relative decline, in which the power resources of other states grow. Experts lament the inability of the US to control states such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Venezuela or Iran, but they allow the golden glow of the past to color their appraisals. The United States' power is not what it used to be, but it also never really was as great as assumed. After World War II, the United States had nuclear weapons and an overwhelming preponderance of economic power but nonetheless was unable to prevent the "loss" of China, to roll back communism in Eastern Europe, to overcome stalemate in the Korean War, to stop the "loss" of North Vietnam, or to dislodge the Castro regime in Cuba. Power measured in resources rarely equals power measured in preferred outcomes, and cycles of belief in decline reveal more about psychology than they do about real shifts in power resources. This session will deal with the following questions: How to characterize US hegemony or decline? Which criteria are most important? How much is the US challenged by China, the EU and other important powers? How much is the US dedicated to global governance?

***Germany. The Reluctant European Hegemon?***

The German Government's 2011 abstention from the United Nations Security Council vote on military intervention in Libya raised questions about Germany's role in the international system. By abstaining, Germany broke with its Western allies and aligned itself with four of the BRICS countries: Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Although Chancellor Angela Merkel declared its abstention was merely related to its unwillingness to participate in a military operation, its 'non-Western' act unleashed a debate on the future of German foreign policy. Critical voices pointed out that the decision to abstain represented a deviation from the traditional principles of transatlantic cooperation with the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). They argued that Germany's actions would cause tension between it and both the US and the EU, and that it would raise fears that Germany may once again be following a *Sonderweg* (special path). The discourse on Germany's voting behavior with regard to Libya was part of a broader debate on whether Germany should reorientate its foreign policy. Going on since 2010, this debate has taken place against the background of Germany's growing role in the EU and in the management of the Eurozone crisis.

While Germany has clearly emerged as the most important European country in economic and political terms, it has been reluctant to play a leadership role. At the same time, the German Government has acknowledged the massive power shifts that have characterised international politics over the past two decades and has made some effort to develop new conceptual tools for its non-Europe foreign policy. Since 2013 German foreign policy changed massively: In 2012, the government outlined its approach to world politics and new partnerships with emerging powers, then since 2015 it declared that Germany is "responsible" and since then Germany's foreign policy was much influenced by the refugee crisis, trade relations with the US, internal European conflicts, and economic and social problems. We will deal with the following questions: What are the main changes in German foreign policy? What drives German foreign policy? What is meant by "Germany a middle power"? How much is Germany responsible? Which are

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the main characteristics of German civil power concept, and how much is it challenged?

**Friday, June 16**

***Global Governance I: the Financial and Trade Order***

***Global Governance II: Climate Policy and the Paris Agreement***

The debates on the future of global economic governance have been particularly acute after the global financial crisis. Entrusting global economic governance from G7/8 to the G20 in order to include emerging powers has been marked as a milestone in global governance. Despite this change, significant challenges remain and gaps still need to be filled to solve global governance. Failure to progress at the multilateral level has led to major concerns that the international community will underprovide much needed governance for global public goods, which are crucial for developmental progress.

We address the following questions: What is global governance? Which institutions are most important? How much did the BRICs provide to global governance in a rapidly changing world, how much do the US and Europe? What international bodies and institutions can be of help with this process? The hallmarks of liberal internationalism—openness and rule-based relations enshrined in institutions such as the United Nations and norms such as multilateralism—could give way to a more contested and fragmented system of blocs, spheres of influence, mercantilist networks, and regional rivalries. Which are the main trends?

**Wednesday, June 21**

***Global Governance III: the Role of Private Actors***

***Global Governance IV: The New World Order and the Future of Global Governance***